From a window in Moscow, Andrei Kolesnikov can see the Mosfilm Tower, a landmark recently scarred by a Ukrainian drone strike. The image serves as a stark backdrop to a conversation about a regime that is increasingly insulating itself from reality even as the war in Ukraine brings the conflict physically closer to the Kremlin’s doorstep.
Kolesnikov, a prominent Russian scholar and author of The Closing of the Russian Mind, has spent years analyzing the internal mechanics of Vladimir Putin’s power. Now labeled a “foreign agent” by the Russian state, Kolesnikov provides a chilling assessment of the current trajectory: Putin is no longer seeking a traditional victory or a diplomatic exit. Instead, he has pivoted toward a strategy of permanent escalation.
According to Kolesnikov, this state of perpetual crisis is not a byproduct of the war, but the extremely essence of the regime’s survival. In a system that has become “sultanistic”—where the personal whims and psychological state of the leader dictate national policy—the war has transformed from a geopolitical tool into a necessary condition for Putin to maintain absolute control over the Russian state and its people.
The Psychology of Resentment and Paranoia
At the heart of Russia’s current trajectory is not a coherent strategic plan, but a deeply personal emotional drive. Kolesnikov argues that Putin’s policy is fueled by resentment—a pervasive feeling of grievance against the West and a desire to “right” historical wrongs. This sentiment has trickled down from the leader to the state apparatus, creating a government that views cynicism and aggression as the only viable modes of interaction with the outside world.
This psychological profile is now manifesting as acute paranoia. The Russian president has become increasingly elusive, rarely appearing in public and tightening the circle of advisors he trusts. While some observers might view this as a sign of weakness or a reaction to the war’s stagnation, Kolesnikov suggests it is a natural evolution of a leader who views the world through the lens of conspiracies and plots.
The danger, Kolesnikov notes, is that this paranoia is not perceived as a flaw by much of the Russian public. Many citizens still view Putin as a leader who possesses secret knowledge or security insights that the average person lacks, leading them to accept his erratic behavior as a necessary component of national security.
The Rise of the ‘Security State’ over Civilian Rule
The internal power balance within the Kremlin has shifted decisively. For years, a tension existed between the “siloviki” (security hardliners) and the civilian administration. That tension has largely vanished, with the security services—specifically the FSB—now exerting dominant influence over state policy.
This shift is most evident in the regime’s approach to information and internal control. While civilian officials may prefer tools like Telegram for propaganda and communication, the security services have pushed for more draconian restrictions on the internet and digital surveillance. Kolesnikov points to the influence of models from Caracas and Tehran as blueprints the FSB has presented to Putin to justify a total crackdown on digital dissent.
The result is a government where the president is less a civilian head of state and more a “president of the special services.” This transition has effectively silenced the civilian elite. While some within the administration may be dissatisfied with the economic decline or the war’s duration, they lack the tools—and the courage—to challenge the security apparatus.
| Feature | Previous Civilian-Hybrid Model | Current Security-Dominant Model |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Influence | Mixed: Technocrats & Siloviki | Dominant: FSB and Intelligence Services |
| Economic Approach | Growth and Global Integration | War Economy and Autarky |
| Information Control | Managed Pluralism/Propaganda | Total Digital Repression/Isolation |
| Decision Making | Consultative within Elites | Personalistic/Sultanistic |
The Paradox of Russian Fatalism
One of the most persistent questions for Western observers is why a war that has cost Russia over a million casualties (killed and wounded) has not triggered a popular uprising. Kolesnikov explains this through the lens of totalitarism and psychological adaptation.
While polls indicate a slight decline in Putin’s approval and a growing sense of “tiredness” among the population, this does not translate into action. The Russian public has entered a state of fatalism. In a society where the cost of dissent is the total destruction of one’s professional and personal life, silence becomes the only rational survival strategy.
- Adaptation: Citizens align themselves with the regime not necessarily out of belief, but as a psychological defense mechanism to avoid stress.
- Atomization: There is a notable lack of compassion for compatriots; many view drone strikes or mobilizations as problems that only matter if they hit their own household.
- Elite Silence: Even dissatisfied elites avoid mentioning the war when discussing economic failures, instead blaming the Central Bank or interest rates to avoid crossing the regime.
The Nuclear Shadow and the ‘Suicide’ Question
As the conflict reaches a deadlock, the possibility of tactical nuclear weapon usage remains the most volatile variable. Kolesnikov suggests that while the regime is likely not “suicidal,” there is a dangerous school of thought among Moscow’s foreign policy experts that the United States might not respond to a limited nuclear strike to avoid a total global escalation.
This hypothesis—that nuclear weapons can be used as a tool of coercion rather than just deterrence—is widely discussed in Moscow’s corridors of power. While there is no consensus on their use, the willingness to consider it as a “critical tool” highlights the desperation of a regime that sees permanent escalation as its only path to survival.
The immediate future of the conflict will likely be defined by this appetite for escalation. With no clear criteria for “victory” or “peace” defined by the Kremlin, the war is transitioning into a permanent state of mobilization that will continue to erode the Russian economy and society from within.
The next critical marker for the regime’s stability will be the upcoming economic reports on inflation and the impact of prolonged sanctions, which may test the limits of the population’s fatalism.
Join the conversation: Do you believe the internal shift toward a security-led state makes the Kremlin more or less predictable? Share your thoughts in the comments below.
